SEPTEMBER 2019 ISSUE

The 63rd Annual Regular Session was held in Vienna, September 16 – 20, 2019. The Conference brought together high-ranking delegates from more than 170 IAEA Member States to discuss the most relevant issues and defined priorities for further cooperation in the global nuclear industry.

Alexey Likhachev, Director General of Rosatom, attending the IAEA session highlighted Rosatom expectations with regard to future election of a new IAEA Director General, in both official statements addressed to participants and interview given to the media.
"It is important that IAEA spirit of continuity remained a predictable, depoliticized platform for exchange of experience and cooperation among the Member States", noted Likhachev in his speech.
During the interview with reporters, he said: "We want the agenda that we have developed in the IAEA to further develop, new directions to emerge".

He noted the need to preserve the agency's professionalism, political impartiality and objectivity in assessment of technologies and events. "There is no executive power in the IAEA, but information power of the IAEA leader is tremendous. It is an expert whom world leaders, national governments and parliaments listen to, and that is why impartiality, objectivity and professionalism in assessment of the situation, adoption of approaches are critically important to us", Likhachev said.

He also pointed to the established traditions such as keeping frank discussions and dialogues, as well as support of specific Rosatom projects that should not be affected by change of IAEA leadership. "There are positions that are assigned to the Russian Federation. We would like these traditions between Russia, Rosatom and the IAEA to be preserved as well", Likhachev said.

Sources:

1. "Rosatom expects continuity from new IAEA Management", September 16, 2019
2. "Rosatom participated in the 63rd IAEA General Conference", September 20, 2019
3. Statement by Alexey Likhachev, Rosatom State Corporation Director General, At the Plenary Meeting of 63^rd Regular Session of the IAEA General Conference

Russia has developed current nuclear security regulatory framework with substantial funding and expert support received under the U.S.-Russian MPC&A cooperation. The U.S. supported development of regulations governing PP and MC&A at nuclear sites, as well as MPC&A licensing and inspections. The cooperation mostly stopped in 2014, although the U.S. continued some support until 2018.

One of the concerns related to this cooperation is whether Russia continues developing and maintaining regulatory framework on its own.
A number of evidences are available that address this concern confirming that Russia has continuous process for issuing and updating nuclear security regulations. Drivers for regulatory changes include new security challenges, need for codifying established practice, identified regulatory gaps or inconsistency between regulations.

Evidences summarized below mostly relate to high-level regulations and regulations issued by Rostechnadzor, as they are publicly available. Less information is provided on Rosatom regulations. Rosatom distributes most of its nuclear security regulations to subordinate organizations only, while only certain regulations are made publicly available.

Improvement of regulatory coverage is a part of Russian nuclear safety and security policy
Russian Nuclear Safety and Security Policy approved by the President in late 2018 defined improvement of nuclear security regulatory coverage as one of strategic objectives for the next few years.
The Policy lists nuclear security challenges and objectives that should be addressed in regulations. The list is regularly updated. E.g. security challenges added to 2018 Policy compared to previous version approved in 2012 are:

• Emergence of new technologies that can be used for either committing unauthorized actions against nuclear sites, or manufacturing nuclear weapons or RDDS
• Persisting threat of illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive material through Russian border and within Russian territory

Security objectives and tasks added to the Policy in 2018 include:

• Introducing risk-based approach to nuclear licensing and oversight
• Developing international cooperation in nuclear security
• Strengthening efforts on preventing illicit trafficking in radioactive material
• Providing physical protection to nuclear sites and transportation of radioactive material against terrorist attacks

Substantial revisions were made to high level nuclear security regulations and promptly elaborated in other documents
Over the last three years Russia revised several regulations and issued new regulations with substantial impact on nuclear security. These regulations capture established practices, cover regulatory gaps and address changing security challenges:

• A number of substantial amendments made to key PP regulation, Rules of Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Facilities approved by Government Decree #456. The amendments affect PP responsibilities at agency and site levels, agency monitoring of PP status, design of site PP equipment system. The amendments also establish legal basis for using automated transportation security system (ATSS) developed with the U.S. support for transportation of category I and II nuclear materials.
• Amendments to primary Federal Law 170-FZ "On Atomic Energy Use." This includes amendment known as "antiterrorist amendment" establishing secured areas adjacent to nuclear sites to support PP implemented at sites, as well as amendment codifying preemployment and periodical background examinations and physical and mental health examinations of site personnel, including MPC&A personnel.
• New Federal Law 187-FZ that establishes requirements to cybersecurity of critical infrastructure, including industrial control systems at nuclear sites.
• A number of regulatory changes with indirect but considerable effect on nuclear security, e.g. amendments to Government regulation on nuclear licensing, including clarification of procedure for nuclear security review during licensing.

The Government and affected government agencies promptly issued a number of regulations needed to implement new security requirements established in high-level regulations.
In addition to substantial changes listed above, a number of editorial changes are introduced to nuclear security regulations on ongoing basis to reflect changes in other regulations and clarify certain provisions. This shows that a process exists aimed at maintaining regulatory framework consistent and unambiguous.

Rostechnadzor updates mandatory requirements to nuclear security
Federal Norms and Rules (FNP) are mandatory nuclear security regulations issued by Russian nuclear regulator – Rostechnadzor. Rostechnadzor is currently working on two FNPs that will soon be enacted:

• Revision of NP-030 Basic Rules for Control and Accounting for Nuclear Material widely known by its Russian acronym OPUK. Currently valid OPUK was enacted in 2012 with substantial U.S. support. Example of improvements anticipated in new OPUK revision: clarified objectives for self-monitoring MC&A status at sites, strengthened requirements for developing calculation methods used to determine nuclear material quantities, additional requirements to storing surveillance data and electronic accounting records, clarified approach to MC&A in material balance areas with both defense and civilian material.
• Revision of NP-085 Requirements to PP of Vessels with Nuclear Facilities and Nuclear Material on Board. Revision's objectives include addressing specifics of PP of first Russian floating nuclear power plant and nuclear service ships. The revision will also reflect recent changes to other PP regulations.

Rostechnadzor issues nuclear security recommendations for sites
Rostechnadzor used to issue a number of safety and security guidelines with the U.S. support. Such guidelines are voluntary, but can help nuclear sites ensure compliance with mandatory security requirements established in FNP.
Over the last three years Rostechnadzor issued a number of security guidelines on its own that address:

• MC&A during nuclear material transfers
• Self-monitoring MC&A status at sites
• Content of key site MC&A procedures
• Taking physical inventory and closing material balance, including trending inventory difference
• Vulnerability assessment and evaluation of effectiveness of site PP system. Development of vulnerability assessment and effectiveness evaluation recommendations received substantial U.S. support, but had not been completed before the cooperation stopped. Rostechnadzor finalized these documents on its own.

Rostechnadzor also has two security guidelines under development that cover PP during design and construction of a site and the use of seals and surveillance equipment for MC&A.

Rostechnadzor maintains and issues regulations on nuclear security licensing and oversight
Below are examples of Rostechnadzor efforts on issuing and maintaining regulations relevant to MC&A licensing and oversight. These efforts were made outside of the U.S.-Russian MPC&A cooperation:

• New revision of primary Rostechnadzor licensing procedure issued in 2014 that includes requirements to sites' MPC&A status reports reviewed during licensing. The procedure was then amended in 2019 to clarify requirements to the MPC&A status reports.
• New Rostechnadzor instructions issued in 2018 for inspectors reviewing site vulnerability assessment and evaluation of effectiveness of site PP system. The development of these instructions started under the U.S.-Russian MPC&A cooperation and received substantial U.S. support, but had not been completed before the cooperation stopped. Rostechnadzor finalized and issued these documents on its own.

Rosatom continues updating and issuing new MPC&A regulations
Below are examples of regulations issued by Rosatom on its own, including during the U.S.-Russian cooperation:

• Revision of procedure for monitoring PP at subordinate sites issued in 2017. The procedure was developed with the U.S. support.
• Revision of three regulations governing Rosatom agency pro-force securing Rosatom sites. Revisions issued in 2017-2019 cover pro-force training, collaboration between pro-force and off-site response force, as well as special pro-force actions, e.g. pat-down inspection.
• Amendment to procedure for certifying safety and security of transportation of nuclear material. The amendment issued in December 2017 includes review against PP requirements in certification procedure.

Rosatom facilitates MPC&A standardization, including the establishment of mandatory standards
High level regulations require sites to establish system for MC&A measurements, MC&A sealing system, and site PP equipment system and define basic requirements to the systems. Details on MC&A measurements, seals and PP equipment are available in various national standards. Although the standards are voluntary by nature, sites often refer to them as a guidance.
Rosatom drafts MPC&A national standards in cooperation with Federal Agency for Technical Regulation and Metrology (Rosstandard) enacting the standards:

• National standards specific to MC&A measurements. Standard on reference standards was enacted in 2018. Rosatom is currently working on two more standards: standard that guides certification of reference standards and standard establishing requirements to site MC&A measurement system. The latter standard is a replacement for standard developed in 2010 with the U.S. support.
• A number of national standards on physical protection systems equipment are scheduled for development and revision in 2019-2020.

Importance of national standards to MPC&A was enhanced since 2017, as the Government allowed Rosatom and Rostechnadzor to make standards mandatory for nuclear sites upon mutual reconciliation. Rosatom and Rostechnadzor have already made a number of standards mandatory for sites over the last two years. This includes standards establishing requirements to physical protection systems equipment. We assume that certain standards on seals used for MC&A may soon become mandatory as well.

Rosatom and Rostechnadzor continue regulatory analysis and planning the development and maintenance of regulations
The U.S.-Russian cooperation included efforts on streamlining a process for developing, maintaining and using MPC&A regulations. Below are two examples showing that Rosatom and Rostechnadzor continue working in this area:

• In 2017, Rosatom leading PPS designer, Eleron, released Monitoring ND software. The software includes electronic database with regulations and allows promptly distributing valid copies of new and revised regulations to sites. More than three hundred regulations are available, both high-level and Rosatom agency regulations governing physical protection at sites. Monitoring ND also provides secure chat-room for reconciling draft regulations by experts from various sites that significantly optimizes regulatory development process.
• Rostechnadzor publishes and regularly updates full list of mandatory requirements to nuclear security at sites. Rostechnadzor also trends violations of such requirements, including risk of violations, and plans regulatory work based on these trends.

Russian Nuclear Security Update regularly reports on various exercises conducted by Russian nuclear sites, Rosatom non-nuclear sites, National Guard, Rosatom agency pro-force, and law enforcements authorities. Relevance of such exercises to nuclear security is not always obvious from the reports. This article provides overview of commonly reported exercises, including examples and applicable regulatory requirements, and explain their relevance to nuclear security.

We consider an exercise relevant to nuclear security based on two criteria:

• Exercise scenario includes implementation of either routine security procedures or response to emergency or unauthorized actions.
• Exercise involves some or all on-site and off-site response force in charge of nuclear security:
  • Nuclear site personnel with physical protection responsibilities.
  • Pro-force securing nuclear sites and closed cities where nuclear sites are located. Such pro-force can be National Guard troops, Rosatom or other agency pro-force.
  • Senior officers managing pro-force at various sites, including nuclear.
  • Off-site response force supporting sites in case of unauthorized actions against sites and emergencies. Off-site response force includes units of Federal Security Service (FSB), off-site troops of National Guard, Rosatom or other agency pro-force, and police units reporting to Ministry of Interiors.

These exercises obviously include exercises at nuclear sites and closed cities, as well as exercises at training grounds and non-nuclear sites that contribute to preparedness of response forces across the board, including those working at nuclear sites. E.g. pro-force joint exercises conducted at pro-force training grounds for pro-force securing various sites, including nuclear, and senior officers managing the pro-force. The other example is exercises at Rosatom non-nuclear sites that involve off-site response force and senior pro-force officers in charge of security of nuclear sites as well.

Exercises meeting these criteria fall into two major groups:

• Exercises on response to unauthorized actions against sites or closed cities
• Emergency response exercises that include training in implementing security measures as part of general emergency response plan

Exercises on response to unauthorized actions against sites or closed cities
Below are several examples of exercises aimed at training on-site and off-site response force from past issues of Russian Nuclear Security Update:

• January 11, 2018. Counter-terrorism exercise at Angarsk Integrated Electrolysis Chemical Plant – Rosatom uranium enrichment facility. Exercise scenario included response to attempt of unauthorized entry to the territory of the Plant by a group of unknown individuals.
• March 6, 2018. National Guard exercise during technical meeting conducted by National Guard command. The exercise involved National Guard swimmers providing security to water area of various sites, including nuclear, and National Guard SWAT supporting on-site pro-force when necessary. The swimmers showed under-water operations part of routine security measures, including inspection of water areas adjacent to secured sites. The swimmers also exercised in neutralizing hypothetical adversary.
• April 11, 2018. National Guard exercises at nuclear icebreaker operated by Atomflot – Rosatom organization operating nuclear powered vessels and nuclear service ships. Exercise scenario included National Guard troops response to seizure of the icebreaker.
• August 24, 2018. Counter-terrorism exercise in Snezhinsk closed city hosting Zababakhin All-Russian Scientific Research Institute for Technical Physics (VNIITF), prime Russian nuclear defense research center. Exercise scenario included response to detecting improvised explosive device in a vehicle inspected at vehicle access control point of closed city.
• February 13, 2019. Counter-terrorism exercise at OKBM Afrikantov site – Rosatom nuclear site. The OKBM designs nuclear facilities, designs and manufactures equipment for the facilities, and provides support to operators. Exercise scenario included response to seizure of site administrative building by off-site adversaries colluding with insiders.
• June 25-26, 2019. Counter-terrorism exercise at Atommash site, non-nuclear Rosatom site manufacturing equipment for nuclear power plants. Exercise scenario included response to firing one of site's buildings and attempt of blowing up site gas distribution station committed by off-site adversaries.

Exercises referred to as counter-terrorism exercises are focused on training response to terrorist attacks against sites or closed cities. These exercises involve a number of authorities, including FSB, National Guard, other law enforcement authorities, and regional and local government represented by antiterrorist committees. Involved entities are trained in collaborative actions to be taken in case of terrorist attack.

Counter-terrorism exercises are important to nuclear security, as counter-terrorism and nuclear security objectives, as well as respective regulatory requirements substantially overlap. Counter-terrorism protection and nuclear security are provided by single site physical protection system (site PPS), including respective equipment, site personnel, pro-force and procedures.

National guard exercises are mostly focused on training on-site and off-site National Guard troops in routine security procedures, e.g. site security inspections, and in response to various unauthorized actions against sites. Certain exercises include training in communicating and collaborating with response force reporting to other law enforcement agencies. Examples above show "general" exercises involving National Guard servants providing security to various sites, including nuclear. Such exercises are not tailored to specific site, but focus on training in specific skills necessary to pro-force, e.g. under-water inspections. The exercises also include exercises tailored to specific nuclear site, like in Atomflot example.

Exercises above are governed by legislation on counter-terrorism and National Guard, as well as regulations on physical protection of nuclear sites:

• Federal Counter-Terrorism Policy, Federal Law on Counter-terrorism and elaborating regulations issued by the Government and President. These regulations assign a number of counter-terrorism authorities and responsibilities to Federal Security Service (FSB), including leading counter-terrorism exercises. Certain responsibilities are also assigned to the National Guard. Procedures for organizing and conducting counterterrorism exercises are defined by FSB regulations and interagency regulations mutually reconciled by concerned law enforcement authorities.
• National Guard conducts exercises pursuant to the Law on National Guard, regulations issued by the President and internal regulations.
• Nuclear sites are obliged participating in counter-terrorism and National Guard exercises by Physical Protection Rules enacted by Government Decree #456, key Russian PP regulation widely known as "PP Rules". The PP Rules state that FSB and National Guard conduct exercises in cooperation with nuclear sites and pro-force securing the sites and notify the sites and on-site pro-force in advance. Russian nuclear regulator, Rostechnadzor, should also be notified. Based on PP Rules, objectives for the exercises include validating effectiveness of site physical protection system, improving collaboration between site management and pro-force, as well as preparing to emergency response.

Russian Nuclear Security Update has no examples of agency pro-force exercises. However, we assume that such exercises regularly take place, as regulations on Rosatom pro-force training refer to exercises as an essential element of pro-force regular training. We will include information on such exercises in our updates as it becomes available.

In addition to exercises sites, FSB, National Guard, Rosatom agency pro-force and other concerned authorities conduct technical meetings regarding security of sites, including counter-terrorism. The meeting is conducted separately or combined with the exercises and can be either general, e.g. on providing counter-terrorism protection to various critical sites located in specific area, or dedicated to security of specific site. Example of such meeting include:

• Meeting on counter-terrorism protection of Novovoronezh NPP held in December 2017
• Meeting on counter-terrorism protection of Beloyarsk NPP held in August 2018

The example meting only included discussions among concerned organizations and experts. Such meetings can also include table top exercises.

Emergency response exercises
Since operators are required to provide nuclear security under both routine and emergency conditions, nuclear security procedures cover emergencies at sites and during transportation of radioactive material. Emergency response exercises conducted at sites normally focus on mitigating emergency, e.g. cleanup of radiological contamination or evacuation of personnel from contaminated area. But since nuclear security emergency procedures are a part of emergency plan, these exercises address nuclear security issues to a certain extent.

Examples of emergency response exercises conducted over the last two years.

• April 30, 2018. Emergency response exercise at a site of Siberian RosRAO branch, Rosatom site handling nuclear waste. Exercise scenario included response to radiological accident by site personnel and Rosatom agency pro-force securing the site.
• May 29, 2019. Emergency response exercise at Atomflot site. Exercise scenario included power shut-down during the on-site relocation of nuclear fuel by crane, mutual notification and following actions of concerned parties, including National Guard and Rosatom emergency response center.
• June 27, 2019. Emergency response exercise in Seversk closed city holding Siberian Chemical Combine. Exercise scenario included response to emergency during transportation of nuclear material by National Guard team responsible for securing the material and Rosatom emergency center.

Russian Nuclear Security Update provided details on these exercises in past issues.

Emergency response exercises listed above involve a number of off-site organizations in charge of safety, including Ministry of Emergencies, response support teams maintained by operators, and Rosatom emergency centers. The example exercises also include notifying pro-force securing site or transportation and transportation on emergencies and their involvement in emergency response in some cases.

Such emergency response exercises are conducted to train all concerned entities in implementing emergency repose plans, as required by a number of nuclear safety regulations.

IAEA and Rosatom signed an agreement, officially designating Rosatom Technical Academy as a Collaborating Center in the field of Nuclear Security Knowledge Management and Human Resource Development. The designation agreement was signed during the 63rd Annual Regular Session of the IAEA General Conference, which was held in Vienna from September 16 to 20, 2019.

Each collaborating center is a scientific institute or organization that offers unique facilities and skill sets in a distinct area related to nuclear technology. Centers are chosen for their ability, capacity and readiness to directly contribute to specific IAEA projects and activities. The cooperation is designed to encourage original research and development, while also helping scientists to share knowledge, resources and expertise, prepare reference materials, validate methods and provide training.

There is the Global Institute of Nuclear Safety and Security (GNSSI) as a unit of the Rosatom Technical Academy. GNSSI has a unique training ground, laboratories, simulators and training classes that are equipped with physical protection systems from the leading manufacturers. Since 2004, GNSSI has conducted 53 international courses on the subject of physical protection; more than 1,100 specialists from 67 IAEA Member States took part in them.

Sources:

1. "IAEA designates Rosatom Technical Academy as Collaborating Center", September 25, 2019
2. "Partnership for Research and Development: IAEA Collaborative Mechanisms Highlighted at 63rd General Conference", September 18, 2019

Rosatom nuclear fuel division, TVEL, has supplied the first batch of mixed uranium-and-plutonium fuel, MOX fuel, for BN-800 fast neutron reactor to the Beloyarsk NPP, Sverdlovsk Region. The loading of eighteen supplied fuel assembles to the reactor is scheduled for the last quarter of 2019.

The MOX fuel for BN-800 is manufactured from a mixture of oxides of depleted uranium accumulated at facilities of TVEL and oxides of plutonium extracted during reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, not plutonium extracted from eliminated nuclear weapons.

The MOX fuel for Beloyarsk NPP was manufactured at the Mining and Chemical Combine (MCC), key Rosatom enterprise for establishing a closed nuclear fuel cycle. The Combine stores and reprocesses NPPs spent nuclear fuel and fabricates MOX fuel for fast reactors. The April 2019 Issue of the Russian Nuclear Security Update published the details on the acceptance of the fuel at the MCC, which confirmed stability and quality of the established MOX fuel production.

After loading the first eighteen MOX fuel assembles to the power unit N4 of the Beloyarsk NPP, the BN-800 reactor will continue to operate with a hybrid core containing both uranium fuel (produced by Elektrostal Machine Building Plant, another TVEL company) and MOX fuel.

"Further deliveries will eventually create a reactor core with a full load of uranium-plutonium fuel. For the first time in the history of Russian nuclear power industry, this will ensure operation of a fast reactor on MOX fuel. It will be the final stage of multiyear work, for the sake of which the BN-800 reactor itself was created, power unit was built, and unique fuel manufacturing capability was established," – commented Vitaly Khadeev, TVEL Vice President for Technology Development and Establishing of the Closed Nuclear Fuel Cycle Production Facilities.

Sources: "TVEL supplied the first batch of MOX fuel to Beloyarsk NPP", August 27, 2019

By the end of 2019, specialists of All-Russian Research Institute for Nuclear Power Plants Operation (VNIIAES) will assess the protection of the automated process control systems from cyberattacks for four domestic NPPs.

VNIIAES operates Industry Methodological Center for Cybersecurity of the process control systems at nuclear facilities since 2018. The November 2018 Issue of the Russian Nuclear Security Update provided detailed information about the Center. Also, VNIIAES is main developer of safety guidelines and regulatory documents for NPP operators.

VNIIAES inspects NPPs industrial control systems for compliance with applicable requirements of nuclear legislation and regulatory requirements to cybersecurity of critical facilities. The Winter 2017/2018 Issue of the Russian Nuclear Security Update provided review of the regulatory requirements on security of the Critical Information Infrastructure.

Experts have already assessed the cybersecurity of three units of Novovoronezh NPP. The results are processed and will be included in the report. Now experts assess the protection from cyberattacks of Kola NPP. By the end of 2019, similar assessments will be conducted at Kalinin and Leningrad NPPs.

Sources:

1. "VNIIAES inspecting cybersecurity of Russian NPPs", August 27, 2019
2. About VNIIAES

Rosatom concluded two contracts with Mayak for removing the decommissioned Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs) from Kamchatka for 92.2 million Rubles (USD $1.4 million) and from Novaya Zemlya for 29.8 million Rubles (almost USD $453,600).

According to the Kamchatka contract, twelve Beta-M type units of decommissioned RTGs should be removed from the facility of DalRAO, a Far East branch of RosRAO, located in closed city Vilyuchinsk, Kamchatka Peninsula. Mayak has to ship them to its facility in Ozersk, Chelyabinsk region, dismantle and place the extracted radionuclide heat sources for the long-term storage. The work must be conducted by November 30, 2021.

RTGs were actively used as a power sources in the lighthouses along the Northern Sea Route during the Soviet times. The fuel element for RTG usually contains Strontium-90 isotope. Since compact alternative sources of energy were developed, RTGs are dismantled worldwide under IAEA supervision as they pose a threat to the environment and are at risk of theft as well. Details on removing of RTGs from the Far East could also be found in November 2018 Issue of Russian Nuclear Security Update.

The contract provides implementation of work in five stages:

1. Conduct of the engineering and radiation survey of the RTGs; manufacturing of the packaging for RTG transportation, and obtaining a permit for its transportation with the RTGs
2. Supplying transportation packages to DalRAO in Vilyuchinsk
3. Decontamination and placement of RTGs in transportation packages
4. Transportation of the RTG packages to Mayak for dismantling
5. Dismantling RTGs; extraction of the radionuclide heat sources and placing all components for the long-term storage

Similar contract covers removing the single RTG from Cape Vyhodnoy, Novaya Zemlya island, by December 15, 2020.

Sources:

1. "The decommissioned Beta-M type RTGs would be removed from Kamchatka", September 2, 2019
2. "The decommissioned RTGs would be removed from Novaya Zemlya", September 2, 2019

On September 9, 2019, first of a kind Floating Power Unit (FPU) Akademik Lomonosov reached final destination, Pevek city in Chukotka region. The FPU was moored at specifically constructed shore facility at Pevek port and will be connected to shore electric grid by the end of 2019.

As defined by the Government, moored FPU and respective shore infrastructure should be secured by the National Guard. National Guard has been securing shore infrastructure prepared for the FPU since the beginning of September and now secures the FPU as well.

National Guard secures the FPU on contractual basis using one of its organizations established to provide protection services to companies and individuals. FPU operator, Rosenergoatom, provides infrastructure and equipment needed for National Guard pro-force and pays for security at the rate established as defined by the Government.

National Guard unit assigned to secure the FPU has done considerable preparatory work to hire and train personnel taking into account FPU specifics. "All preparations are completed, including hiring and training personnel for pro-force unit and equipping the site with necessary security equipment", said General Viktor Zolotov, National Guard commander.

National Guard carefully selected personnel hired to secure the FPU taking onto account the level of theoretical knowledge and practical skills, as well as working experience. The personnel received advanced training, including classes delivered by Rosatom experts. In addition to regular pro-force training, the personnel were trained in using equipment specific to FPU and modern security equipment, as well as in diving and driving patrol boats.

Sources:

1. "Rosguard started providing security to first of a kind floating power unit Akademik Lomonosov", September 15, 2019
2. "Rosguard prepares for arrival of floating power unit Akademik Lomonosov", August 20, 2019
3. "Non-agency pro-force unit in Pevek city (Chukotka region) hires junior officers", December 12, 2018

Rosatom together with the National Operator for Radioactive Waste Management (NO RAO) and the Saint-Petersburg brunch of Rosatom Technical Academy organized the XIII Annual Scientific and Technical Seminar titled "Organizational and Regulatory Support of Two Systems: State System for Control and Accounting for Radioactive Substances and Radioactive Waste and Integrated State System for Radioactive Waste Management".

More than 40 officials from various concerned organizations attended the seminar, including officials from concerned nuclear sites, organizations responsible for managing the state accounting and control system, government agencies, representatives of Rostechnadzor, and the Russian Academy of Sciences.

During the seminar, the following issues were discussed:

• Prospects for development of the Integrated State System for Radioactive Waste Management
• Strategies for radioactive waste management in the Russian Federation
• Regulatory coverage and oversight activities for Radioactive Waste Management
• Operation, maintenance and upgrade of the State System for Control and Accounting for Radioactive Substances and Radioactive Waste
• Balancing capabilities and needs of NO RAO and nuclear sites' operators

Sources: "Organizational and legal support of the State System for Control and Accounting for Radioactive Substances and Radioactive Waste and Integrated State System for Radioactive Waste Management, was discussed in Sochi", September 13, 2019

In September 2019, an agreement for international scientific cooperation was signed by five German and Russian organizations engaged in research and development of approaches to radioactive waste management and the final disposal of radioactive waste in deep geological formations.

The German organizations included the Helmholtz Research Centre, the Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR) and the Society for Plant and Reactor Safety (GRS). The Russian organizations included National Operator of Radioactive Waste Management (NO RAO) and the Nuclear Safety Institute of Russian Academy of Sciences (IBRAE).

The agreement covers cooperative research on radioactive waste management and exchange of experience in the construction, operation and decommissioning of final isolation facilities, as well as confirmation on the long-term safety of the final isolation of radioactive waste in deep geological formations.

The agreement is a part of the scientific and technical interaction between Russia and Germany, which began in 1986 in the field of nuclear safety research and research on radioactive waste disposal.
"The agreement Is important step towards further development of cooperation in the field of scientific research between our countries", - said Lyudmila Zalimskaya, the official representative of Rosatom on international projects.

The agreement was signed during one of the regular technical meetings conducted within the framework of cooperation. The cooperating organizations also summed up the results of joint work, determined plans for the next two years, and outlined new areas of cooperation as well. The next meeting is planned for 2021.

Sources:

1. "Development of scientific cooperation between Russia and Germany in the field of nuclear radiation safety was discussed by experts of the two countries", September 9, 2019
2. "Russia and Germany agree on cooperation in closing the nuclear fuel cycle", September 9, 2019

International workshop on nuclear security culture was held on 8 – 11 July 2019 in Moscow, Russia.
The workshop was attended by total of 38 officials from Russia, Austria, Germany, Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Egypt, India, Congo, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Libya, Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Thailand, Vietnam, and Armenia.

The workshop was funded from IAEA nuclear security fund and hosted by Research Institute for Instruments (NIIP), a Rosatom research center. The workshop included the following:

• Introducing participants to IAEA documents relevant to nuclear security culture
• Training aimed at fostering basic concepts of nuclear security culture
• Overview of IAEA model of nuclear security culture
• Training in conducting the self-assessment of nuclear security culture at nuclear sites, including the use of assessment criteria
• Discussion of human factor in nuclear security
• Discussion of lessons learned and best practices relevant to nuclear security

This workshop is essential to establishing common international approach to enhancing nuclear security culture, including rising awareness on the importance of nuclear security culture to safety and security of nuclear sites and materials. Such workshops also help promote IAEA and member states' best practices in nuclear security culture.

NIIP hosting the workshop presented a report on experience in enhancing security culture at nuclear sites. NIIP will further work on enhancing security culture and plans contributing to Rosatom and IAEA efforts on the development of nuclear security culture guidelines, training in nuclear security culture and conducting international conferences and workshops.

Sources: "International workshop "Nuclear Security Culture in Practice" has been completed", July 29, 2019

Russian organizations with nuclear security responsibilities regularly conduct exercise aimed at increasing their preparedness to address nuclear security threats. Background on these exercises is provided in the article "Nuclear Security Exercises in Russia: Background".
This article overviews exercises information about which has become available since publication of the last Update.

Response to Unauthorized Actions

• September 12. Counterterrorism exercise Atom-2019 at a site of Rosatom Pilot Center for Decommissioning Uranium-Graphite Reactors located in Seversk closed city, Tomsk region, that also hosts Siberian Chemical Combine. The exercise included training of on-site and off-site response force in responding to terrorist attack, evaluation of potential consequences of the attack and preparing for mitigating the consequences.
• September 12. Counterterrorism exercise Atom-2019 at Angarsk Electrolysis Chemical Combine, Rosatom site operating uranium enrichment facilities located in Angarsk city, Irkutsk region. The exercise included training of on-site and off-site response force in responding to seizure of a site by terrorist group.

Emergency Response Exercises

• Emergency response exercise was conducted on September 18 and 19 at Smolensk NPP. The exercise included mitigating hypothetical accident caused by devastating hurricane, including the evacuation of NPP personnel. More than thousand officials from the NPP, Rosatom emergency centers and other organizations were involved.

Other Exercises

• On September 20, National Guard and other law enforcement authorities conducted national contest between operators of underwater drones, including those used for nuclear security purposes. Participants demonstrated skills in underwater search, recognition of mines and manipulations with various underwater objects.
• On September 18, Saint Petersburg branch of ISOTOP, Rosatom organization specialized in export and transportation of nuclear and radioactive materials, conducted a workshop for Federal Customs Service. The workshop included training in detecting and identifying cargo with nuclear and other radioactive materials at customs control points, as well as in verifying the declared characteristics of the cargo.
• National technical meeting for National Guard senior officers responsible for operation and maintenance of security equipment was held on September 26. The meeting was aimed at introducing new equipment to the officers and providing relevant training.

According to Russian legislation, Rosatom and its subsidiary organizations must publish information related to procurements using federal budget funding as well as their own money. This information is published at a dedicated web-site - http://zakupki.rosatom.ru/. Around three hundred procurements, including procurements related to MPC&A (material protection, control and accounting) are published daily. In September 2019, 240 procurements related to nuclear security were announced.

This article reviews the most interesting procurements and related trends.

Physical Protection of NPPs
Rosenergoatom is a power generation division of Rosatom and one of the largest power generation companies in Russia. It is responsible for the nuclear security of domestic NPPs. Procurements for onsite protection services, supplies, and maintenance of PP equipment are published daily. The following are procurements of interest:

• Analytical support to Rosenergoatom in the field of physical protection, organization of counterterrorist protection of NPPs and establishing protected areas with a special legal regime for 84.2 million Rubles (USD $1.3 million)
• Multiple procurements of Kola NPP for upgrading various PP systems for 59.6 million Rubles (USD $915,500)
• Vehicle screening system for Kursk NPP control points for 23.4 million Rubles (USD $360,000)
• Novovoronezh NPP procurements for supplying PP equipment and spare parts for replacing the outdated equipment for 20.2 million Rubles (USD $310,300) and special electrical equipment for PPS for 7.7 million Rubles (USD $120,000)
• Construction of armored structures as part of the modernization of the protected area of Novovoronezh NPP for 9.9 million Rubles (USD $152,000)
• Commissioning and load tests of PP equipment of the restricted area along the highway during commissioning of the 2nd unit of Novovoronezh NPP-2 for 16.2 million Rubles (USD $250,000)
• Equipping the control point of Kola NPP with an anti-ramming barrier for 9.5 million Rubles (USD $146,000)
• Explosives detector for Leningrad NPP for 8.8 million Rubles (USD $135,200)
• Developing the design documentation for PPS modernization for the main building of the 4th unit of Smolensk NPP for 5.7 million Rubles (USD $87,600)
• Spare parts for upgrading automatic security alarm system of Kalinin NPP security service for 4.6 million Rubles (USD $70,700)
• Multiple procurements for onsite protection services and maintenance of access control to the protected area of Kursk and Kalinin NPPs' administration and amenity buildings for total sum of 49 million Rubles (USD $752,600)

Physical Protection of Rosatom Nuclear Sites
Apart from NPPs, other Rosatom enterprises purchase services for ensuring physical protection as well. Many of these sites hold substantial quantities of nuclear materials in forms suitable for making nuclear explosive devices, which makes these sites attractive for theft. Some purchase examples:

• Multiple procurements of Mining and Chemical Combine for repair of the of the perimeter fencing for total sum of 34.2 million Rubles (USD $525,300)
• Equipping access control points of OKBM Afrikantov, Experimental Design Bureau for Mechanical Engineering, with biometric identification system for 31.4 million Rubles (USD $482,300)
• Multiple procurements of PO Start, part of the nuclear weapons complex of Rosatom, for supplying equipment for access control system and constructing the internal fencing of the protected area of closed city Zarechny for total of 15.9 million Rubles (USD $244,200)
• Various PP equipment for the Instrumentation Factory at Trekhgorny for total of 19.8 million Rubles (USD $304,000)
• Equipment for access control and alarm systems for Electrohimpribor Plant for 13 million Rubles (USD $200,000)
• Upgrading the PP equipment for ISOTOP for 12.6 million Rubles (USD $193,500)
• Developing the design documentation for PPS modernization for Institute of Reactor Materials for 9.1 million Rubles (USD $140,000)
• Multiple procurements of VNIIEF, Russian Federal Nuclear Center in Sarov, for supplying PP equipment for total sum of 9 million Rubles (USD $138,200)
• Multiple procurements of Mayak Chemical Combine, including supplying of spare parts for access control system and the quick-deployment alarm system for establishing local secured zones on unprepared terrain and covert control of the territory at certain distance to the guarded objects; modernization of PPS for fissile materials storage facility; providing license for Vega-2 software developed for evaluating the PPS effectiveness. The total sum of procurements is 9.5 million Rubles (USD $146,000)
• Installing PP equipment for Siberian Chemical Combine, including sentry protection, security alarm equipment, video complexes for vehicle inspection and one-way speakerphone, for 7.1 million Rubles (USD $110,000)
• Multiple procurements of Ural Electrochemical Integrated Plant for upgrading the PP equipment for 4.8 million Rubles (USD $73,700), and development, supply and installation of mobile access control point facility for 4.9 million Rubles (USD $75,300)

Procurements of Rosatom agency pro-force
The Rosatom agency pro-force, Atomguard, publishes a number of purchases daily, including procurements related to conducting medical support and examinations, the primary (planned) periodic testing of theoretical knowledge and verification of practical shooting skills of employees, as well as modernization of the shooting ranges, supplying vehicles and radio electronic equipment, etc. In September 2019, Atomguard allocated over 8.8 million Rubles (USD $136,100) for these purposes.
Additionally, Leypunsky Institute of Physics and Power Engineering (IPPE), Obninsk, published multiple procurements for modernization and repair works in the buildings of its security forces for total of 5.8 million Rubles (USD $89,000). Beloyarsk NPP allocated over 3.6 million Rubles (USD $56,400) for supplying uniforms and shoes for its security forces.

Other Procurements

• Procurements of TVEL, a Rosatom fuel division, for providing insurance services for its companies, including cargo insurance for 478.8 million Rubles (USD $7.4 million) and property damage insurance for 299.5 million Rubles (USD $4.6 million). The SOW for both procurements include requirements for covering risks of terrorist acts and sabotage
• Atomflot allocated almost 153.5 million Rubles (USD $2.4 million) for transportation of the spent nuclear fuel from Murmansk to Mayak processing facility and its further reprocessing
• Maintenance, technical support and modernization of automated nuclear materials control and accounting system for Kola NPP and Beloyarsk NPP for almost 6 million Rubles (USD $92,500) each
• Atomspetstrans, a Rosatom organization specialized in transportation of nuclear materials, allocated almost 57.3 million Rubles (USD $883,600) for maintenance and repair of special vehicles of its branches and over 20.6 million Rubles (USD $317,700) for new vehicles and equipment
• Automated Transportation Security System (ATSS) simulator for Atomspetstrans for 3.3 million Rubles (USD $50,900)
• Equipping vehicles of Institute of Reactor Materials with ATSS system for 18.9 million Rubles (USD $291,500)

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